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699 
OUR RECORDS PANOPTICON AND THE AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
STEPHEN E. HENDERSON* 
“Secrets are lies.  Sharing is caring.  Privacy is theft.”1  So concludes 
the main character in Dave Egger’s novel, The Circle, in which a single 
company that unites Google, Facebook, and Twitter—and on steroids—has 
the ambition not only to know, but also to share, all of the world’s 
information.   It is telling that a current dystopian novel features not the 
government in the first instance, but instead a private third party that, 
through no act of overt coercion, knows so much about us.  This is indeed 
the greatest risk to privacy in our day, both the unprecedented, massive 
collection and retention by third parties of private information, and then 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, the University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.S. in Electrical 
Engineering, University of California at Davis; J.D., Yale Law School.  I am grateful to the 
symposium participants for bringing their expertise to Norman, Oklahoma, and to my 
colleague Joseph Thai for moderating the symposium panels.  I am likewise grateful to the 
members of the Oklahoma Law Review for their exceptional planning, for the hospitality 
provided to our guests, and for their hard work in editing this symposium volume.  In 
particular, I thank Editor-in-Chief Selby Brown, Symposium Editor Charles Knutter, and 
Assistant Symposium Editor Amanda Lee. 
 1. DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE 303 (2013).  For a fun, albeit distressing, summary of 
arguments against privacy, see id. at 276-304.  In a nutshell, if there were no privacy, there 
would be little to no crime: Why do the crime when you know not only that you will “do the 
time,” serving any set penalty, but that you will also suffer immediate and certain social 
approbation?  Id. at 280.  Moreover, if all were known, it would prevent people from 
forming a misleading impression of others based only on knowing a few characteristics or 
events.  See id. at 286-87.  As for those things we are embarrassed for others to see, one of 
two things will allegedly happen: either that behavior will be found sufficiently normal that 
we will no longer be embarrassed, or it will become clear that the behavior actually is 
deviant and so we should stop.  Id. at 288.  Google CEO Eric Schmidt seems to be a 
believer: “If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t 
be doing it in the first place.”  Cade Metz, Google Chief: Only Miscreants Worry About Net 
Privacy, REGISTER (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/12/07/schmidt_on_ 
privacy/ (quoting Eric Schmidt).  And why is privacy theft?  Because you steal from those 
who could otherwise have vicariously experienced through you, including those physically, 
mentally, financially, or otherwise unable to do so on their own.  See EGGERS, supra, at 299-
304.   
Missing from all of these proffered arguments, of course, is the remarkable richness of 
varied and unique personal relationships, all the experimenting and growth that those 
relationships encourage, and all the joy and carefree spontaneity they bring to what could 
otherwise be a remarkably unfriendly and dreary existence. 
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secondarily the access to that information by others, including law 
enforcement.  For the past seven years, from 2006 to 2013, I served as the 
Reporter in drafting the black letter and commentary to what is now the 
twenty-fifth volume of the American Bar Association Standards for 
Criminal Justice, this volume relating to law enforcement access to third 
party records.  Considering the talent that served on the Task Force and 
Standards Committee, and the significant vetting of the ABA process, it 
would be surprising if the Standards did not get many things right, and 
hopefully that is evident in the Standards themselves.  But inevitably any 
first-of-its-kind project of this magnitude will be imperfect and incomplete.  
Continuing to move the conversation forward was my purpose in 
organizing this Symposium.  The articles in this volume are a testament to 
its success, and here I explain the drafting of the Standards, including a few 
substantive highlights, and place the Standards in their unique historic 
context.  We have begun to capture, record, and analyze everything within 
given domains, as opposed to selectively preserving only what is 
contemporaneously considered relevant or necessary.  As we step into this 
brave new world, the Standards have great value not only to our 
democratic decision makers, but to all of us, as we seek to reap its benefits 
without sacrificing our privacy, and with that privacy our individuality and 
even our personhood. 
I. The World in Which We Live 
In late 2006, the American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice 
Standards Committee appointed a Task Force to draft a new set of Criminal 
Justice Standards, this one relating to Law Enforcement Access to Third 
Party Records (LEATPR Standards).2  The new Standards would constitute 
a new volume in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, a massive project 
that had begun just over forty years earlier, in 1964, when it would have 
been almost impossible to imagine how much information humanity now 
stores.3  In their book Big Data, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth 
Cukier present a telling example from the field of astronomy:  
                                                                                                                 
 2. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD 
PARTY RECORDS (2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS].  Individual standards will be referred 
to using the format ‘Standard x-x.’  The black letter Standards are reproduced in this volume as an 
Appendix, and the entire Standards volume is available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/third_party_access.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 3. See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty 
Years of Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 10, 10. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/2
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When the Sloan Digital Sky Survey began in 2000, its telescope 
in New Mexico collected more data in its first few weeks than 
had been amassed in the entire history of astronomy.  By 2010 
the survey’s archive teemed with a whopping 140 terabytes of 
information.  But a successor, the Large Synoptic Survey 
Telescope in Chile, due to come on stream in 2016, will acquire 
that quantity of data every five days.4 
One terabyte is 1012 bytes (1,000,000,000,000 bytes) and has become a 
standard size for personal computer hard drives, despite being more 
computer memory than was available on Earth a mere fifty years ago.5  To 
provide some perspective, a single character can be stored as a byte, 
meaning an article like this one written in a text editor would fill on the 
order of 70,000 bytes, or .00000007 terabytes.6  An image file might 
occupy one megabyte, or .000001 terabytes.  The Large Hadron Collider, 
the world’s highest-energy particle accelerator, generates data on an even 
more impressive scale than our telescopes.  When in operation, it generates 
up to six gigabytes of data every second, meaning one terabyte in under 
three minutes.7 
Science has provided similarly impressive techniques to gather 
information about ourselves.  The human genome project required a decade 
to sequence the three billion base pairs at a cost of $2.7 billion.8  Today that 
sequencing can be completed in a day at a cost of $3000.9  A life logger, 
meaning one who attempts to self-record all of his experience, generates 
over a terabyte of data a year.10  And while they might be far less 
                                                                                                                 
 4. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 7 (2013). 
 5. The People’s Panopticon, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2013, at 27.  Of course, digital 
memory operates in binary, so the same term can also refer to 240 bytes (the number two 
multiplied by thirty-nine other twos), a slightly different number but of the same order of 
magnitude.  The two conventions are used interchangeably (and sometimes confusingly) for 
lesser amounts of data, but typically the decimal convention is used for larger amounts. 
 6. An article written in a program other than a text editor will include data on character 
formatting (e.g., to account for font size and italics), and thus will be a larger file.  One byte 
is 8 bits, meaning it can contain the numbers 0 to 255, because 28=256.  
 7. Magnetic Tape to the Rescue, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2013, at 3 [hereinafter Magnetic 
Tape]. 
 8. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 7; Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big 
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at F1. 
 9. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 7; Lohr, supra note 8, at F1. 
 10. The People’s Panopticon, supra note 5. 
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impressive as a matter of hard science,11 social networking and other online 
activity amply demonstrate the huge amount of data we collectively 
generate:  
Google processes more than 24 petabytes [24,000 terabytes] of 
data per day, a volume that is thousands of times the quantity of 
all printed material in the U.S. Library of Congress.  Facebook, a 
company that didn’t exist a decade ago, gets more than 10 
million new photos uploaded every hour.  Facebook members 
click a ‘like’ button or leave a comment nearly three billion 
times per day . . . .  [T]he 800 million monthly users of Google’s 
YouTube service upload over an hour of video every second.  
The number of messages on Twitter grows at around 200 percent 
a year and by 2012 had exceeded 400 million tweets a day.12 
When it comes to uploading video, YouTube is not even the biggest 
game in town.  Users of Dropcam upload over 1000 hours of video a 
minute13 as they use surveillance cameras to “[n]ever miss a moment this 
year.”14 
The amazing breadth and depth of stored information was very much on 
our minds as we began drafting the new set of ABA Standards in 2007.  
Nonetheless, it is remarkable to think on how much more information is 
stored in 2013, the year I completed drafting the Commentary.  While 
estimating the world’s stored information is difficult and uncertain, Martin 
Hilbert and Priscila López calculate that in 2007 there were approximately 
300 exabytes (meaning 300 million terabytes) of stored data.15  The amount 
of analog information hardly grows at all, but the amount of digital data 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Jason Pontin, Why We Can’t Solve Big Problems, MIT TECH. REV., Oct. 24, 
2012, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/429690/why-we-cant-
solve-big-problems/.  The cover of this edition intriguingly features a picture of Astronaut 
Buzz Aldrin with the headline, “You Promised Me Mars Colonies.  Instead, I Got 
Facebook.” MIT TECH. REVIEW, Oct. 24, 2012, at front cover, available at http://digital. 
technologyreview.com/?iid=69328#folio=1. 
 12. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 8. 
 13. Quentin Hardy, Today’s Webcams See All (Tortoise, We’re Watching Your Back), 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at A1. 
 14. DROPCAM, https://www.dropcam.com/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
 15. Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, 
Communicate, and Compute Information, SCIENCE, Apr. 1, 2011, at 60, 62.  Hilbert and 
López define storage as “the maintenance of information over a considerable amount of time 
for explicit later retrieval.”  Id. at 60; see also Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s 
Technological Capacity to Process Information, MARTINHILBERT.NET, http://www.martin 
hilbert.net/WorldInfoCapacity.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/2
2014]       OUR RECORDS PANOPTICON & THE ABA STANDARDS 703 
 
 
doubles approximately every three years.16  Thus, in 2013, Hilbert estimates 
the amount of stored information in the world at around 300 exabytes times 
2 times 2, or 1200 exabytes.17  That is over one billion terabytes.  Others 
estimate the amount of stored data grows even faster, doubling every two 
years,18 while the capacity of the fastest way to communicate it, fiber optic 
cables, doubles every nine months.19    
To put a less technical face to this, in 2010 Eric Schmidt, CEO of 
Google, explained that every two days (and by now perhaps every day) we 
produce more information than was produced over the entire course of 
civilization up to the year 2003.20  Thus, every two days of global data 
production equals or exceeds the amount of information contained in all of 
the conversations that have ever taken place.21 
These numbers are mindboggling, and it will require the novel 
techniques of big data22 to make sense of information on such massive 
                                                                                                                 
 16. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 9 (describing the work of 
Hilbert).   
 17. Id. 
 18. See JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE IN 2020: BIG DATA, 
BIGGER DIGITAL SHADOWS, AND BIGGEST GROWTH IN THE FAR EAST 1 (2012), available at 
http://idcdocserv.com/1414 (predicting a doubling every two years); Michiko Kakutani, 
Watched by the Web: Surveillance Is Reborn, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at C1; Magnetic 
Tape, supra note 7 (referencing such an estimate). 
 19. ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF 
PEOPLE, NATIONS, AND BUSINESS 5 (2013). 
 20. MG Siegler, Eric Schmidt: Every 2 Days We Create as Much Information as We 
Did Up to 2003, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 4, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/04/schmidt-
data/. 
 21. Id.; see also Lohr, supra note 8. 
 22. There is not a single definition of “big data”: 
Initially the idea was that the volume of information had grown so large that the 
quantity being examined no longer fit into the memory that computers use for 
processing, so engineers needed to revamp the tools they used for analyzing it 
all. . . . One way to think about the issue today . . . is this: big data refers to 
things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller one, to 
extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways that change markets, 
organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments, and more. 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 6.   
Big Data is a vague term, used loosely, if often, these days.  But put simply, the 
catchall phrase means three things.  First, it is a bundle of technologies.  
Second, it is a potential revolution in measurement.  And third, it is a point of 
view, or philosophy, about how decisions will be – and perhaps should be – 
made in the future.   
Lohr, supra note 8, at F1. 
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scales.  But if we step back and think of our everyday experiences, it is easy 
to see that very significant information about each of us is recorded by third 
parties that used to be recorded by no one.  Whereas I used to pay cash for 
many purchases, today I buy nearly everything in an identified and recorded 
manner.  And it is not merely what I ultimately purchase that is recorded.  
Retail store, library, and bookstore browsing are traditionally transient and 
anonymous, but today I browse online where everything is potentially 
recorded, from how long I look at a page to where my mouse hovers.23  Nor 
will offline, brick-and-mortar store browsing remain anonymous, since high 
definition store cameras can record a shopper’s every move, including 
using facial recognition to determine ethnicity and identity.24  And whether 
we are shopping online or off, soon eye-tracking technology will be able to 
track and record where our eyes linger as we browse.25     
Dictionary and encyclopedia browsing are transient and anonymous, but 
I do these online too.  Google knows the words I cannot spell or define as I 
take advantage of my always-on and always-available connections, from 
my desktop computer to my iPad to my smartphone.26  My service 
providers know and can record everything I do online, and other tracking 
companies try to learn the same.27  The broadcast television of my youth 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Lohr, supra note 8, at F1; Steve Rosenbush, Facebook Tests Software to Track Your 
Cursor on Screen, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/10/30/ 
facebook-considers-vast-increase-in-data-collection/.   
 24. Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is Tracking Your 
Cell, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at A1; Stephanie Rosenbloom, In Bid to Sway Sales, 
Cameras Track Shoppers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at A1; We Snoop to Conquer, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21571452-security-
cameras-are-watching-honest-shoppers-too-we-snoop-conquer. 
 25. See The Eyes Have It, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/ 
technology-quarterly/21567195-computer-interfaces-ability-determine-location-persons-
gaze; The All-Telling Eye, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21533362. 
 26. Spelling Corrections and Suggestions, GOOGLE GUIDE, http://www.googleguide. 
com/spelling_corrections.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).  
 27. For example, we know that when we visit a website, our browser will often 
differently color those links that we have previously visited.  Some data aggregators have 
sought to take advantage of this by embedding code in sites to which they have access that 
thereby surreptitiously determines what other sites one has visited.  See Mathew J. Swartz, 
Dataium Settles Browser History Sniffing Charges, INFORMATIONWEEK (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.informationweek.com/security/compliance/dataium-settles-browser-history-sniff 
ing-charges/d/d-id/1112817.  Other companies use all sorts of other methods to track online 
activity.  See, e.g., Kate Murphy, How to Muddy Your Tracks on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2012, at B7; Tracking the Trackers: Our Method, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/2
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was anonymously viewed, but now I consume media from providers who 
record what I watch and when I watch it.28  Even the solitary reading of a 
good book has become a shared spectacle.  When I delve into an e-book, 
the “data exhaust” of such reading is shared and tracked on an incredibly 
nuanced scale: where I read, when I read, how long I spend on a page, what 
words I look up in the built-in dictionary, and anything I highlight (and as a 
consequence, I don’t highlight).29   
How about that weekend drive?  Ford Motor Company’s top sales 
executive recently made headlines when he bragged, “We know everyone 
who breaks the law.  We know when you’re doing it.  We have GPS in your 
car, so we know what you’re doing.”30  And it is not merely your car 
manufacturer who is watching.  The weekend drive is potentially now 
shared with the insurance company seeking to keep an eye on my driving,31 
the cell phone provider needing to know the location of my phone,32 and the 
navigation app helping me on my way.33  At least portions are shared with 
others, such as toll-tag operators, license plate readers, stationary cameras, 
the life-logger driving behind me, and the drone hobbyist flying his new 
toy. 
While I have resisted in a futile attempt at maintaining some control, 
many have taken advantage of the benefits of remote access and robust 
backup by moving what used to be stored only on a personal computer into 
the internet cloud.34  In short, we share a great deal about our lives with 
others, and this trend will only accelerate with the impending “internet of 
                                                                                                                 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703977004575393121635952084 
(discussing three of the fifty most common tracking methods). 
 28. Neal Ungerleider, How Big Data Keeps Cable TV Watchers Hooked, FAST COMPANY 
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.fastcompany.com/3004619/how-big-data-keeps-cable-tv-watchers-
hooked.  
 29. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 113 (explaining the genesis 
of the term “data exhaust”). 
 30. Jaclyn Trop, The Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at B1 (quoting Jim Farley). 
 31. Brad Tuttle, Big Data Is My Copilot: Auto Insurers Push Devices That Track 
Driving Habits, TIME (Aug. 6, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/08/06/big-data-is-my-
copilot-auto-insurers-push-devices-that-track-driving-habits/.  
 32. Jessica Leber, How Wireless Carriers Are Monetizing Your Movements, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/513016/how-wireless-carriers-
are-monetizing-your-movements/. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Joe Baguley, How Cloud Computing Is Changing the World . . . Without You 
Knowing, GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-
network-blog/2013/sep/24/cloud-computing-changing-world-healthcare.  
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things,” in which devices like lights, thermostats, and security cameras are 
already internet connected, and soon everything from our refrigerators to 
our running shoes will be as well.35  Even data that seemingly has no utility 
is retained in “data tombs,” because storage is cheap and the analytics of 
big data are teaching that new and valuable uses of old data may be just 
around the corner.36 
There is certainly an appetite for information.37  In perhaps what will 
become the classic story of the dawn of the big data era, Charles Duhigg 
chronicled how Target’s analytics department managed to piece together 
when a customer is pregnant.38  Reeling in pregnant shoppers can pay big 
dividends because such a significant life event shakes up our otherwise 
routine habits.39  So when Target’s analytics determined that, for example, 
pregnant women around the beginning of their second trimester purchase 
increased quantities of unscented lotion, the retailer was able to mine 
seemingly routine and benign purchase data to predict which customers 
might be pregnant, scoring them on a “pregnancy prediction” scale and 
generating a list of tens of thousands of likely pregnant customers.40  The 
store’s initial blunderbuss targeted advertising raised the ire of the father of 
a teenager, understandably perturbed that the store would send his daughter 
personalized advertisements clearly intended for those who were 
expecting.41  But when the store manager called to apologize, the father was 
contrite; it turned out there were things happening in his home of which he 
was unaware.42  
                                                                                                                 
 35. On the internet of things, see, for example, Jesse Emspak, Smart Shoes Could Help 
Runners Hit Their Stride, LIVESCIENCE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.livescience.com/41844-
smart-running-shoes-improve-runners-gait.html; Brad Spurgeon, Racing into an 
Interconnected Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/ 
sports/autoracing/racing-into-an-interconnected-future.html?pagewanted=all; Bob Sullivan, 
The ‘Internet of Things’ Pits George Jetson vs. George Orwell, NBC NEWS, June 29, 2013, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/internet-things-pits-george-jetson-vs-george-orwell-6C. 
10462818. 
 36. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 98-104. 
 37. “[B]ecause Internet companies could collect vast troves of data and had a burning 
financial incentive to make sense of them, they became the leading users of the latest 
processing technologies, superseding offline companies that had, in some cases, decades 
more experience.”  Id. at 6. 
 38. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at MM30. 
 39. See id. (“[N]ew parents are a retailer’s holy grail.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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More recently, thanks to Edward Snowden, we have become aware of 
the massive data surveillance of the National Security Agency, “an 
electronic omnivore of staggering capabilities.”43  While some portions 
have been crafty “first person” surveillance, such as the NSA hacking 
internet security and corrupting cell phones in order to track them even 
when powered down,44 many of the revelations relate to the NSA obtaining 
data from third parties.  Some of that third party gathering has been overt, 
such as gathering all telephone metadata,45 and some covert, such as 
gathering cloud storage data as providers transfer it among their own data 
centers.46  But either way, this third party surveillance relies upon the 
breadth of personal information now residing with third parties.47  
                                                                                                                 
 43. Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
2013, at A1.  For more on the connection between big data and the NSA, see James Risen & 
Nick Wingfield, Silicon Valley and Spy Agency Bound by Strengthening Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 2013, at A1.  And the revelations keep coming.  See, e.g., Geoff White, Revealed: UK 
and US Spied on Text Messages of Brits, CHANNEL 4 NEWS, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www. 
channel4.com/news/intercept-text-messages-spy-nsa-gchq-british-phone (documenting NSA 
gathering of 200 million text messages a day). 
 44. See Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1; Shane, supra note 43, at A1; Jill Scharr, NSA Tracks 
Turned-Off Phones – But Phone Makers Don’t Know How, TOM’SGUIDE (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/nsa-track-off-mobiles,news-17851.html. 
 45. See Charlie Savage, A.C.L.U. Files Lawsuit to Stop the Collection of Domestic 
Phone Logs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2013, at A18.  For a cogent analysis of the program’s 
legality, see David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, LAWFARE RESEARCH 
PAPER SERIES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 1, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
09/Lawfare-Research-Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf.  At its core, the NSA argument that Patriot 
Act section 215 was meant to permit the preservation of all third party records on the basis 
that some miniscule fraction might prove useful at a future time is tenuous.  Were Congress 
to permit such staggeringly broad collection, one would expect—and we should demand—
that it then debate the chilling effect this will have, the necessary security precautions for 
such a database including audit controls and punishments for breaches, the justifications for 
accessing that database, etc.  It is a stretch to think that even our too-often dilatory Congress 
meant to leave all of those critical matters undecided, implicitly authorizing the secret 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to draft all of the critical design elements.  This is 
not to say, however, that such appropriately defined authorization would necessarily be ill-
advised.  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What?: The Importance of 
Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata 
Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725, 738-39 (2014) (applying ABA LEATPR 
Standards to NSA collection).   
 46. See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data 
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-
centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-
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So, what was clear in 2007 as we began drafting the ABA Standards is 
even clearer today: there is a great need for a coherent, methodical 
approach to the regulation of law enforcement access to third party 
information.  The LEATPR Standards are the first to articulate such a 
framework.  Before turning to a brief explanation of their drafting process, 
it is worth spending a moment more on why all of this matters.   
The Standards Commentary, including that to Standard 25-3.3, defines 
and explains the importance of information privacy.  That privacy, meaning 
for each of us the right to control what information about us is conveyed to 
others and for what purposes, is of course much larger than merely the issue 
of law enforcement access.  It is central to human development and dignity, 
and should restrict third parties as well.  Yet only the government can force 
disclosure of information unrestrained by market and other pressures, and 
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice are inherently limited to 
considering this subset. 
But a subset it is, meaning law enforcement access to third party records 
is a meaningful component of the larger issue.  And in this larger context 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger has made important insights, including that 
“[m]emory impedes change.”48  In his 2009 book, Delete, Mayer-
Schönberger beautifully empathizes the human experience, an experience 
that for each of us is often tolerable—and even wonderful—only because 
we can change.  An all-recording and all-remembering digital society could 
effectively stifle that opportunity: 
I fear the real bottleneck of conflating history and collapsing 
time is not digital memory, but human comprehension.  Even if 
we were presented with a dossier of facts, neatly sorted by date, 
in our mind we would still have difficulties putting things in the 
right temporal perspective, valuing facts properly over time. . . . 
From the perspective of the person remembering, digital memory 
                                                                                                                 
d89d714ca4dd_story.html.  In retrospect, it is rather remarkable that these cloud providers 
thought to encrypt data sent to and from the customer, but not when transmitted among their 
own disparately located servers. 
 47. Like many, I am critical of much of the NSA surveillance, but I am not as distrustful 
of the institutional motives.  When there are no external restraints, it is logical to gather 
absolutely everything one can subject only to resource restraints; in the world of intelligence, 
who knows what will ultimately prove useful?  But of course well-intentioned surveillance 
can be almost equally destructive to social participation and free society, and thus we must 
figure out how to implement proper restraints without hobbling our intelligence apparatus. 
 48. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 125 (2009). 
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impedes judgment.  From the perspective of the person 
remembered, . . . it denies development, and refuses to 
acknowledge that all humans change all the time.  By recalling 
forever each of our errors and transgressions, digital memory 
rejects our human capacity to learn from them, to grow and to 
evolve.49 
In the characteristically deadpan assessment of The Economist magazine, 
“A perfect digital memory would probably be a pain, preserving unhappy 
events as well as cherished ones.”50  Mayer-Schönberger poignantly asks, 
“Do we want a future that is forever unforgiving because it is 
unforgetting?”51 
On the other hand, as the police and prosecutors involved in the 
formulation of the Standards were right to often point out, the things some 
would most like forgotten are the evidences of their victimization of others.  
In the context of law enforcement access to records, we often must 
remember and must access to keep us safe from those who would do harm.  
It is this very difficult balance that the LEATPR Standards aim to enable: 
permitting law enforcement reasonable access to keep us safe and 
preventing unnecessary access to keep us secure.  
II. Drafting the LEATPR Standards 
Perhaps understandably, the American Bar Association conjures 
different reactions in different people, including among attorneys.52  So it is 
worth explaining the rigorous and inclusive drafting process of the 
LEATPR Standards, which mirrors that of all of the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice.  First, in late 2006, a Task Force was appointed to begin 
the drafting process.  The chair was Michael Bender, then a Justice on, and 
later the Chief Justice of, the Colorado Supreme Court, and I was of course 
the Reporter.  Together we would shepherd the Standards through the six-
plus years of drafting.  The members of the Task Force were two 
prosecutors, two practicing attorneys, and three prominent academics, two 
of whom (Christopher Slobogin and Andrew Taslitz) had very significant 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. 
 50. Every Step You Take, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2013, at 13. 
 51. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 48, at 4-5. 
 52. See, e.g., David Segal, For Law Schools, a Price to Play the A.B.A.’s Way, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at BU1 (discussing controversy over the ABA’s law school 
accreditation role); Adam Liptak, Legal Group’s Neutrality is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
31, 2009, at A14 (discussing controversy over the ABA’s judicial screening role). 
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standards drafting experience of their own, and the third of whom (Paul 
Ohm) is a leading scholar on privacy in the information age.  The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice all appointed liaisons.  
Because this was a new set of Standards, we had to start from the very 
beginning, including reading existing standards and delimiting our scope.  
Although the title page of the LEATPR Standards denotes them as a “Third 
Edition,” this merely reflects that the ABA is currently in its third iteration 
of its Criminal Justice Standards project.53  The LEATPR Standards have 
no predecessor in the ABA Standards or in those written by other 
organizations.  Over the next three years, the Task Force met in person 
eight times and corresponded many more times electronically, culminating 
in a draft that in March of 2010 was sent to the nine-member Criminal 
Justice Standards Committee.  Like the Task Force, the Standards 
Committee is to have balanced representation, and specifically aims to have 
three prosecutors, three defense attorneys, and three academics and judges, 
along with nonvoting liaisons from prosecutorial and defense 
organizations.54 
The draft transmitted to the Standards Committee was not unanimous, a 
matter of significant concern because the ABA prefers to proceed by 
unanimous, or at least overwhelming, consent whenever possible.55  The 
goal of the Standards project has always been to create “balanced and 
practical” recommendations that “reflect[] a consensus of the views of 
representatives of all segments of the criminal justice system.”56  
Fortunately, the Standards Committee was very ably led by Martin Marcus, 
a judge on the New York Supreme Court.57  Judge Marcus and I are both 
respectably stubborn, and our emails drafting various provisions would go 
back and forth a substantial number of times (we neared running out of 
reasonable colors to denote the most recent edits).  But thanks to Judge 
Marcus and the other members of the nine-member Standards Committee 
(including the person who would become the chair before the drafting 
process was complete, Judge Marcus’ judicial colleague Mark Dwyer), we 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 13 (explaining second and third editions). 
 54. Id. at 14. 
 55. See id. at 15.  
 56. Id. at 14. 
 57. In an often successful attempt to confuse people, the Supreme Court is New York’s 
trial court of general jurisdiction.  See Structure of the Courts, NYCOURTS.GOV (Feb. 15, 
2012), http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/structure.shtml.    
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came out of the Standards Committee with a unanimous draft in a little over 
a year.  We were substantially aided by a former prosecutor (Peter Pope of 
New York) and a current prosecutor (Matthew Redle of Wyoming), who 
were willing and able to carefully consider what prosecutors require to 
fulfill their mission.   
The next stage was the thirty-four-member ABA Criminal Justice 
Section Council, where the Standards underwent two “readings,” which 
provided full days to consider and amend their content.  As will be no 
surprise at this point, that Council was broadly representative of the 
criminal justice system, and prior to the Council’s consideration the draft 
was widely circulated to other interested parties and persons.58  Again we 
were fortunate to have good leadership, this time by practitioner Janet 
Levine, and so, with modification, the Standards were approved for 
consideration by the ABA House of Delegates.  It was during this stage, 
however, that I believe the two most unfortunate drafting decisions were 
made, both of which are discussed later in this paper (the expanded grand 
jury carve-out and the constitutional jurisprudence carve-out). 
The draft was once more circulated to interested parties, and the ABA 
House of Delegates considered and approved the black letter standards on 
February 6, 2012.  I then turned to writing the final commentary, and that 
commentary was approved by the Standards Committee in March of 2013, 
thus completing the twenty-fifth volume in the ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records.  Hopefully, in 
time, this volume will enjoy the wide circulation and use that other volumes 
have experienced.59  
III. Introducing the LEATPR Standards 
As part of the Standards Commentary I drafted a complete 
Introduction,60 and elsewhere I have introduced and applied the LEATPR 
Standards to the topic of location tracking.61  I will not seek to replicate that 
full introduction here, but provide a condensed version for those new to the 
Standards.  For convenient reference, the black letter is included as an 
Appendix to this volume. 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 15. 
 59. See id. at 10-13; 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.3(f) (3d ed. 
2007). 
 60. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 1-16. 
 61. Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United 
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2013). 
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The LEATPR Standards relate to law enforcement investigatory access 
to, and storage and disclosure of, records maintained by institutional third 
parties.62  In other words, they address government agents seeking to 
acquire evidence from existing records to be used in the detection, 
investigation, or prevention of crime.  Because different constitutional 
principles govern, because different interests predominate, and simply as a 
matter of not tackling more than could responsibly be completed in a single 
iteration, the Standards do not address access for purposes of national 
security,63 civil investigation,64 or criminal prosecution.65  The Standards 
also do not address records access from an individual not acting as a 
business entity (e.g., police acquiring a letter written to a friend from that 
friend),66 and do not address an institutional third party “deciding of its own 
initiative and volition to provide information to law enforcement.”67  The 
Standards also do not address acquisition of information contemporaneous 
with its generation or transmission, because such “wiretapping” is already 
the province of other Standards.68  Finally, and more questionably, the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. My text here is adapted from the LEATPR Standards Introduction.  See LEATPR 
STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 5-11. 
 63. STANDARD 25-2.1(a). 
 64. See STANDARD 25-2.1(b) commentary. 
 65. STANDARD 25-2.1(b).  For purposes of the Standards, “criminal prosecution” 
follows the federal Sixth Amendment trigger, meaning the initiation of adversary judicial 
proceedings.  See id. 
 66. STANDARD 25-2.1(d). 
 67. STANDARD 25-2.1(f)(ii).  Not only is this an inherent limitation in Criminal Justice 
Standards, but the government is unique: 
[A] focus on government activity reflects the reality that only the government 
exercises the power to compel disclosure of information and to impose civil 
and criminal penalties for noncompliance.  Only the government collects and 
uses information free from market competition and consumer preferences.  
When dealing with the government, individuals have no opportunity to express 
their expectations of privacy by choosing to do business elsewhere or by not 
engaging in transactions at all.  We, like the framers of our Constitution, 
recognize that in the government context, the law alone provides—or should 
provide—protection for those expectations. 
DEP’T OF DEF. TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST TERRORISM 24 (2004), available at http://www.fredhcate.com/Publications/TAP 
AC_Report%20Final.pdf. 
 68. See STANDARD 25-2.1(e); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SECTION A: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE 
COMMUNICATIONS (3d ed. 2001); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE SECTION B: TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE (3d ed. 
1999).  
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Standards do not address records access via a grand jury subpoena or a 
“functionally equivalent prosecutorial subpoena,”69 a topic I address in the 
next section of this article.       
Part I of the Standards provides definitions, Part II delimits the 
Standards’ scope, and Part III articulates the core governing principles.  
Parts IV, V, and VI then provide the substantive recommendations, Part IV 
governing the categorization and protection of information, Part V the 
access to records, and Part VI record retention, maintenance, and 
disclosure.  Part VII then provides accountability for those substantive 
recommendations. 
In many ways, Part IV is the heart of the Standards.  A decision maker, 
often a legislature but also potentially a court or an administrative agency, 
first determines the level of privacy for a given category of information.70  
For example, should banking transactions be considered highly private, 
moderately private, minimally private, or not private?71  The Standards 
provide four important criteria that should be considered in making this 
determination, in addition to considering the relevance of present and 
developing technology.72  The Standards do not, however, suggest a 
particular answer, thus respecting local circumstances, changing needs, and 
the necessarily difficult nature of this inquiry.  The four privacy criteria 
consider, in a nutshell, the reason for and societal importance of the transfer 
to the third party, the personal nature of the information, whether such 
information is accessible and accessed by others, and existing law.73   Once 
                                                                                                                 
 69. STANDARD 25-2.1(c). 
 70. STANDARD 25-4.1. 
 71. Why four categories (essentially large, medium, small, or nothing at all) instead of 
three or five?  Obviously there is no magic number; increasing the number of categories 
increases nuance but sacrifices administrability.  For a thoughtful defense of using some sort 
of categorical system, as opposed to a continuum, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, Third Party 
Records Protection on the Model of Heightened Scrutiny; 66 OKLA. L. REV. 747, 754-61 
(2014).  But see generally Thomas P. Crocker, Ubiquitous Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 791 
(2014) (questioning whether a categorical system will ineffectually protect privacy).   
 72. STANDARD 25-4.1. 
 73. Id.  In full, the four criteria are the extent to which 
 (a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional third party is 
reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or 
is socially beneficial, including to freedom of speech and association; 
 (b) such information is personal, including the extent to which it is intimate 
and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside 
of the initial transfer to an institutional third party it is typically disclosed only 
within one’s close social network, if at all; 
 (c) such information is accessible to and accessed by non-government 
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this degree of privacy is determined, it sets a threshold level of protection: 
highly private records—meaning those that contain highly private 
information—are highly protected, moderately private records are 
moderately protected, etc.74  Absent consent,75 emergency aid, or exigent 
circumstances76; consistent with the law of privilege77; and absent any 
greater constitutional protection78; the Standards provide that law 
enforcement should be permitted to access a highly protected record via a 
warrant supported by probable cause.79  For moderately protected 
information, access should require a court order supported by reasonable 
suspicion or, if the legislature or other decision maker so chooses, a court 
order supported by relevance or issued pursuant to a prosecutorial 
certification.80  Access to minimally protected information should require a 
prosecutorial or agency determination of relevance.81  And access to 
unprotected information should be permissible for any legitimate law 
enforcement purpose.82  Although the privacy of a category of information 
alone sets this threshold, there may be circumstances in which that 
threshold makes it too difficult to solve otherwise solvable crime.  In that 
case, the legislature or other decision maker may, thinking also of the 
privacy implications, consider reducing the level of protection 
accordingly.83   
The Standards also provide for access to inclusive bodies of de-identified 
records (that is, records not linkable through reasonable efforts to an 
identifiable person) when law enforcement has reason to conduct data 
                                                                                                                 
persons outside the institutional third party; and 
 (d) existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or allows access to 
and dissemination of such information or of comparable information. 
Id.  For a modified approach drawing insights from constitutional jurisprudence outside of 
the Fourth Amendment (e.g., considering rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict 
scrutiny with its narrow tailoring requirement), see generally Blitz, supra note 71.  
 74. STANDARD 25-4.2(a). 
 75. STANDARD 25-5.1. 
 76. STANDARD 25-5.4. 
 77. STANDARD 25-5.3(c). 
 78. STANDARD 25-2.2. 
 79. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(i).   
 80. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii). 
 81. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii). 
 82. STANDARD 25-5.3(d). 
 83. STANDARD 25-4.2(b).  For an argument that there should be an analogous provision 
that would provide greater protection to otherwise minimally protected information in 
certain privacy-crucial contexts, see Crocker, supra note 71, at 810.   
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mining.84  Finally, if the record is highly or moderately protected, law 
enforcement should typically provide notice to the focus of the record, but 
that notice can be, and often will be, delayed.85 
The Commentary includes examples applying the Standards to a 
hypothetical park shooting and then to a bank computer hack.86  In another 
article, I apply them to location tracking,87 and in this volume, Susan 
Freiwald applies them to cell-site location records.88  The Standards 
recognize that a consensus concerning law enforcement access to records is 
still developing, but also acknowledge the need to appropriately strike a 
delicate balance between law enforcement’s legitimate need for access to 
records and the privacy interests of the subjects of those records.  By setting 
forth privacy criteria and articulating a framework, the Standards will assist 
legislatures and other deliberative bodies in carrying out this critical task. 
IV. Improving the LEATPR Standards 
I will allow the excellent symposium papers to make their own 
arguments and contributions, other than dropping the occasional footnote 
where I have been unable to resist noting their insights.  I do not want to 
detract from them, nor at this early stage attempt to contribute to them.  Not 
only will they be valuable to those seeking to implement the Standards, but 
they are valuable more generally to theorizing and developing this body of 
law.  For example, one of the benefits of the Standards project has been to 
reveal, or at least to highlight, some critical uncertainties in the core 
concepts of relevance, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause.89  
Additionally, in several years, with the passage of new events and new law 
it will come time to update the Standards, and these papers, and future riffs 
upon them, will be invaluable.   
                                                                                                                 
 84. STANDARD 25-5.6.  For an application of these Standards to the National Security 
Agency’s bulk collection of communications metadata, see Slobogin, supra note 45, 735-40.   
 85. STANDARD 25-5.7. 
 86. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 11-16. 
 87. Henderson, supra note 61, at 815-21, 826-31. 
 88. Susan Freiwald, Some Light in the Darkness: How LEATPR Standards Guide 
Legislators in Regulating Law Enforcement Access to Cell Site Location Records, 66 OKLA. 
L. REV. 875, 908-17 (2014).  Professor Freiwald has not only been a key voice in the 
academic debate, but has participated in the principal federal litigations. 
 89. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Distortions: Exploring the Limits 
of the ABA LEATPR Standards, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 831, 844-53 (2014); Slobogin, supra note 
45; Andrew E. Taslitz, Cybersurveillance Without Restraint? The Meaning and Social Value 
of the Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Governmental Access to 
Third-Party Electronic Records, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839 (2013).  
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For now, I will content myself with making several points of drafting 
history. 
A. The Investigative Grand Jury 
The LEATPR Standards exempt not only the federal grand jury from 
their scope, and not only similar investigative state grand juries, but more 
broadly “access to records via a grand jury subpoena, or in jurisdictions 
where grand juries are typically not used, a functionally equivalent 
prosecutorial subpoena.”90  This language leaves two questions, one of 
which is at least partially answered in the Commentary, and one of which is 
not: What does this mean, and where did it come from? 
As for what the exception means, the Commentary first describes the 
historic, permissive jurisprudence relating to the federal investigative grand 
jury; describes the reasons to question the continued vitality of that 
permissive jurisprudence; and then explains as follows: 
There was robust debate on these topics during the drafting of 
these Standards.  Ultimately, however, these Standards are in 
accordance with the historic treatment, including acknowledging 
a longstanding alternative in some jurisdictions where grand 
juries are typically not used.  Legislatures, courts, and 
administrative agencies should be careful, however, to strictly 
cabin this exception to means for which (1) there is historical 
practice that has not been discredited and that remains relevantly 
applicable, and (2) that historical practice includes privacy 
safeguards equivalent to those of the federal grand jury.91 
That Commentary is the best indication I can give of what a 
“functionally equivalent prosecutorial subpoena” would be, because the 
construct is a creation of the ABA Criminal Justice Section Council.  My 
goal in drafting the Commentary language was to remain true to the 
Council’s desire, while also to prevent this exception from being too 
broadly read, and thereby misread.   
Where did this language come from?  In other words, why generate this 
seemingly ill-defined and novel category?  Presumably like many others 
before us, we struggled with what to make of the investigatory grand jury.  
As a Task Force, we chose to remain true to the reality of grand jury 
subpoenas in operation and therefore treated a grand jury subpoena as 
                                                                                                                 
 90. STANDARD 25-2.1(c). 
 91. STANDARD 25-2.1(c) commentary. 
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equivalent to any other prosecutorial subpoena, meaning it would suffice to 
access only minimally protected information.  This would certainly work a 
significant change in the current law, but it is a change that, in my mind, 
would be beneficial.  Blind continuation of a historical anomaly calls to 
mind Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous assertion:  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past.92   
Whatever role the grand jury may retain as a bulwark against 
government oppression, it does not play that role when an assistant U.S. 
Attorney issues a subpoena. 
However, when our Task Force draft reached the Standards Committee, 
members almost immediately identified our treatment of the grand jury 
subpoena as a political nonstarter, meaning that any such change to the 
much-reverenced federal grand jury would not ultimately see the light of 
day.  So, we added the grand jury subpoena as an option to access records 
containing highly protected information, thus effectively equating the 
subpoena to a warrant.  This might have been too strong, as even current 
muddled jurisprudence does not equate the two, at least where non-records 
evidence is at issue and thus courts do not feel hemmed by the third party 
doctrine.93  In any event, while the Standards Committee draft permitted a 
grand jury subpoena to suffice for all records, no matter the level of 
privacy, we did not include any language permitting a “functional 
equivalent” to also suffice. 
During the first Reading before the Section Council, a council member 
objected to this favored status on the grounds that a grand jury subpoena is 
“grand jury” in name only, raising the same objection that had won the day 
before the Task Force.  The resolution was to exempt grand jury subpoenas 
from the Standards altogether.  Grand jury subpoenas would now be exempt 
from the Standards via Part II (the scope provisions), meaning the 
Standards simply say nothing about grand jury subpoenas.  This was 
seemingly the only way to both give deference to the historically favored 
status of this instrument and to recognize that in practice the grand jury 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897). 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 736 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting a grand 
jury subpoena for a buccal swab). 
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subpoena is issued at the discretion of a prosecutor.  At least this was the 
only way that could politically survive.  Grand jury subpoenas were sui 
generis—one of a kind—and the Standards therefore did not speak to them. 
While that was probably a wise move, at the second Council Reading we 
added the nebulous “functional equivalent” language without, in my mind, 
anyone really understanding or appreciating its scope.  This was one of the 
few times in the drafting process where I felt a change was made without 
due deliberation.  Fortunately, I do not expect it to be very significant given 
the desire to limit it to federal-grand-jury-like proceedings, but nor do I 
think it was a helpful addition given the confusion it might engender and 
the potential for misinterpretation. 
B. The Court Constitutional Carve-Out 
Just like I worry that the nebulous grand jury carve-out might be 
misinterpreted, I regret another change also made by the Section Council.  
Indeed, if misunderstood, this change is more likely to have serious 
deleterious consequences. 
As the Standards were drafted in the Task Force and then the Standards 
Committee, we always had three audiences in mind: courts engaged in 
constitutional decision making, legislatures enacting law, and agencies 
promulgating rules.  Not only was constitutional adjudication central 
because the scholarship undergirding the Standards was largely derived 
from constitutional appellate decisions, but its importance was reinforced 
by the leadership of our chair, Michael Bender, Chief Justice of the 
Colorado Supreme Court.  It was clear to all of us that courts are very much 
in need of guidance in making the difficult determinations of precisely what 
constitutional protection to provide various types of third party information.  
Of course, statutory and administrative requirements will sometimes differ 
from the constitutional floor, but all three require a framework for making 
these decisions and that framework is what the Standards provide. 
Unfortunately, when we reached the Section Council, we encountered 
the view that it was not the province of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards 
to inform constitutional decision making.  Thus, the first of our three 
intended audiences shrunk to “courts that may act in a supervisory 
capacity,” primarily meaning those state courts empowered to craft 
common law.94  Clearly this is not to say that courts engaged in 
constitutional interpretation will not find much of use in our Standards.  
Indeed, such a claim is impossible given the genesis of, for example, our 
                                                                                                                 
 94. STANDARD 25-3.4.   
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privacy factors in state constitutional law.95  But the carve-out could well 
unintentionally discourage courts from using the Standards, which could 
severely stunt their growth.  I can only hope that will not prove to be the 
case.96 
C. National Security 
The LEATPR Standards do not relate to records access for purposes of 
national security, meaning an investigation of a foreign power or an agent 
thereof.97  Previous sets of Standards have made a similar carve-out,98 and it 
makes good sense given the different governing constitutional principles 
and government needs, and the practicalities of not knowing what national 
security surveillance takes place given a lack of necessary clearances and 
the required “need to know.”99 
However, it is worth noting that our preliminary decision as a Task Force 
was actually to the contrary: we would address government access both for 
purposes of law enforcement and national security, and we looked to 
educate ourselves about both.  As I wrote in an early internal memorandum, 
“Not only is the line between the two becoming increasingly difficult to 
draw, but national security surveillance since the attacks of September 11, 
2001, makes clear that such acquisition is both important and potentially 
subject to abuse.”100  Ultimately, however, it would simply have been 
overwhelming to consider them both together in the first instance, 
especially given the different governing law. 
D. Human Development and Dignity 
Even for scholars who, like myself, are largely content with a control 
theory of information privacy, we ultimately tie its benefits to core notions 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See STANDARD 25-3.4 commentary. 
 96. For a view that any standards will fail absent an even stronger tie to the 
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of personal identity, development, autonomy, and dignity.101  American law 
tends to be wary of such language, however, and that played out during the 
drafting of the Standards.  The Task Force draft included as a general 
principle (what is now Standard 25-3.3) that law enforcement acquisition of 
records “can infringe the privacy of those whose information is contained in 
the records, chill information transfers, and thereby diminish human 
development, dignity, and freedom of speech and association.”102  The 
Standards Committee eliminated the reference to human development and 
dignity, but ultimately did add helpful, if less encompassing, language in its 
place: “Law enforcement acquisition of records maintained by institutional 
third parties can infringe the privacy of those whose information is 
contained in the records; chill freedoms of speech, association, and 
commerce; and deter individuals from seeking medical, emotional, physical 
or other assistance for themselves or others.”103 
E. Probable Cause of What?—Or, the Object of the Search 
As Christopher Slobogin develops in his contribution to this volume, 
there are significant uncertainties in applying the traditional concepts of 
relevance, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause.104  He focuses in 
particular on uncertainties with respect to how evidential the “object” that 
the government is seeking must be: must it be contraband, a fruit of crime 
or an instrumentality or crime, can it be “mere evidence,” or can it be 
anything that might lead to evidence of guilt?  Although these vagaries 
were briefly discussed at various stages of the Standards’ drafting, we 
ultimately made no concerted attempt to resolve them.  Thus, for example, 
for highly protected records the Standards require “a judicial determination 
that there is probable cause to believe the information in the record contains 
or will lead to evidence of crime.”105  As I describe elsewhere, the italicized 
language was added during the second reading before the Criminal Justice 
Section Council for a relatively tangential reason and with little 
discussion.106 
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Slobogin is particularly concerned about justificatory standards that 
permit access to anything that might aid “an investigation.”107  For example, 
imagine that access to phone records requires reasonable suspicion, defined 
as a moderate chance.  There is a significant difference between the 
following: (1) demonstrating a substantial chance that person ‘X’ is a meth 
dealer, and therefore positing a moderate chance that his phone records are 
relevant to the investigation because he might have contacted known drug 
offenders; and (2) demonstrating a substantial chance that person ‘X’ is a 
meth dealer, and demonstrating a moderate chance that his phone records 
contain evidence of crime by, say, an informant’s explanation that X set up 
his deals via telephone.108  In other words, when the Standards use “relevant 
to an investigation,” are they merely meaning to lower the required 
quantum of suspicion, say from forty percent for probable cause to thirty 
percent for reasonable suspicion to fifteen percent for relevance?  Or are 
they also meaning to change the “object” of that suspicion, requiring only 
connection to the investigation as opposed to locating evidence of crime?  
Other than for de-identified records, where different language is used, I 
believe it was the former, meaning merely a lesser quantum of suspicion.  
Thus, during the drafting it was pointed out that the Stored 
Communications Act requires relevance “to an ongoing criminal 
investigation” as part of its reasonable suspicion standard,109 and that such 
language was not thought to work any expansion in theory or practice.  And 
it is possible that when it comes to a quantum of suspicion as low as that of 
relevance, there is little to no practical difference regardless: if phone 
records are relevant to some meth investigations, they are ipso facto 
relevant to this one. 
Nonetheless, a jurisdiction opting for one of the lesser LEATPR 
Standards protections for records containing moderately protected 
information should take note of the potential breadth of the relevance 
standard.110  Indeed, perhaps the most important specific contribution of 
Slobogin’s paper is its critique of the Standards’ inclusion of anything less 
than reasonable suspicion as a default protection for moderately protected 
records.111  More generally, as Slobogin, Taslitz, and Ferguson have all 
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begun to develop, this will be an area of continuing interest in criminal 
procedure.    
V. Conclusion 
Between the emergence of big data and the revelations of Edward 
Snowden, it is difficult today to avoid talk of access to records.  For those 
of us who have been involved in this area of the law for many years, 
including in the drafting of the ABA LEATPR Standards, that increased 
public consciousness is a good thing, and hopefully the Standards will be 
put to good use and, where found wanting, improved upon.  This 
symposium is certainly a good start for the academic component.  
In conclusion, I briefly note two areas I think will be of increasing 
importance in the coming years.  First, as big data teaches what can be 
learned from existing data gathered for limited purposes, law enforcement 
will be inclined to combine and mine the vast amounts of information it 
collects.112  As merely an isolated but telling example, when a cellphone is 
reported stolen in New York City, the police routinely acquire the phone’s 
calling information going forward.113  Regardless of the statutory legality of 
this acquisition,114 and regardless of its utility in solving the theft or 
robbery, there is much less justification for dumping all of the records so 
obtained into a growing database.  Yet that is precisely what police are 
doing.115  So, future iterations of the LEATPR Standards might want to 
spend more time thinking about imposing use restrictions on law 
enforcement data, an issue that Harold Krent very ably raised years ago but 
whose time might have finally come for both constitutional and statutory 
law.116  Now that we store so much more information to begin with, and 
that big data analytics make analysis of that data, and analysis of old, pre-
existing data, powerful and telling, we need use controls more than ever 
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before.  Big data analytics can be incredibly useful to law enforcement, 
including to officers on the beat,117 but will be unduly invasive of privacy 
unless constitutionally or statutorily restricted. 
Finally, I continue to become increasingly convinced that we need better 
dialogue, including law enforcement being more forthcoming regarding 
what records access it conducts and for what purposes.  While I have 
written about this before,118 two more recent data points have come to my 
attention.  We did not know until recently that AT&T has for the past 
twenty-six years maintained an enormous database of phone records 
tracking every call that passes through its switches.119  One of the reasons 
the database remained secret for so long is because when law enforcement 
uses that database it never admits such access in court or otherwise.  
Instead, it whitewashes the investigation either by omitting all mention of 
the phone records, or by re-accessing the same information a second time 
using a different method.120  That sort of deception might be thought 
beneficial to snare unknowing criminals, but it also prevents any discussion 
about the privacy implications for the innocent. 
Another point of records access that some law enforcement would prefer 
to keep under wraps is obtaining location information from cell phone 
providers, including the use of “tower dumps” that reveal every phone near 
a certain cell tower in a given time period.121  When USA Today recently 
issued records requests and learned that one quarter of responding law 
enforcement agencies have obtained information from cell tower dumps, 
some agencies refused to respond on the ground that “criminals or terrorists 
could use the information to thwart important crime-fighting and 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See Wendy Ruderman, New Tool for Police Officers: Records at Their Fingertips, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2013, at A17 (describing “the newest tool in the Police Department’s 
crime-fighting arsenal: a smartphone”).  According to Ruderman, “The technology offers 
extraordinary levels of detail about an individual, including whether the person has ever 
been a passenger in a motor vehicle accident, a victim of a crime or in one instance, a drug 
suspect who has been known by the police to hide crack cocaine in his left sock.”  Id. 
(internal punctuation omitted). 
 118. See Henderson, supra note 61, at 835-38. 
 119. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing 
N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, at A1. 
 120. Id. (including the law enforcement slides, which are available at Synopsis of the 
Hemisphere Project, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/
09/02/us/hemisphere-project.html). 
 121. For more on cell tower dumps, including their analysis under the Standards, see 
Henderson, supra note 61, at 803-08, 815-21, 823-31. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
724 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:699 
 
 
surveillance techniques.”122  Agencies have been similarly coy regarding 
their use of devices that mimic cell phone towers in order to track phone 
location in real time.123  Thus, in one recent court opinion it is reported that 
police “did not want to obtain a search warrant because they did not want to 
reveal information about the technology they used to track the cell phone 
signal.”124  According to the prosecutor, the police had a nondisclosure 
agreement with the company owning the technology.125  And per the 
testimony of an investigator, “[W]e prefer that alternate legal methods be 
used, so that we do not have to rely upon the equipment to establish 
probable cause, just for not wanting to reveal the nature and methods.”126  
Highly weaponized paramilitary police have taken a page from our military, 
but when they start to articulate the refrains of national security, clearly 
policing has gone too far.  Whatever benefits there are to nondisclosure, in 
the context of ordinary policing there are at least comparable benefits to 
robust and honest discussion.   
The ABA LEATPR Standards are, at the very least, an important step in 
the right direction.  They are the product of over six years of discussion, 
dialogue, debate, and compromise, and are the first set of standards to guide 
legislatures, courts, and agencies in making the difficult decisions of how 
best to regulate law enforcement access to ubiquitous and varied third party 
records.  It was my privilege to serve as their Reporter and to convene this 
symposium to continue moving the ball forward. 
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